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Many commentators have noted the fact that the so-called "Eastern enlargement" of
the EU is unique, in the sense that never before have countries which are so much poorer
than the EU been admitted. Furthermore, they are being admitted to an EU which is far
more internally liberalised (the single market) and intergrated (EMU) than previously.
Finally, the applicant countries are far more liberalised internally and open internationally
than was the case with the previous enlargement to relatively poor countries (the so-
called "Southern enlargement" of the 1980s).  We believe that this unique combination of
circumstances is likely to generate unanticipated problems for the applicant countries in
their conduct of macroeconomic policy in the run-up to EU and later EMU accession.
The problems we predict stem from the combination at one time of the following factors:
1. Expected rapid growth in the applicant countries (far faster than the EU itself);
2. Real appreciation resulting from the well known Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect;
3. Free capital movements;
4. The need to satisfy the Maastricht criteria and join EMU within ten years.
These factors are likely to lead to high current account deficits, which it will be dificult
for the authorities to limit to prudent levels. We describe the underlying pressures in
Section 2, discuss suitable macroeconomic policy responses in Sections 3 and 4, and
conclude in Section 5. At the core of our analysis lies an attempt to combine what we
know about the macroeconomics of rapidly growing poorer countries with the standard
presecriptions of the Mundell-Flemming model and the institutional requirements of the
pre-EU and pre-EMU accession periods.
2. Medium and Long-run Trends in the Applicant 
Countries
There are three principal effects which are likely to exert a "demand" for current
account deficits (and for the matching capital account surpluses to finance them):  
1. Expected growth: people who expect to be richer in future than they are at
present will behave rationally if they smooth their consumption path by borrowing today
in order to consume more now, and repaying their debt later. At the level of a whole
country this leads to foreign borrowing (capital inflow) and a current account deficit. If a
number of countries expect  their economies to grow, the faster growing ones should
5
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number of reasons:
(i) they have stopped pursuing the very bad economic policies which they had in the
past under central planning (pervasive government control, extensive subsidies, massive
foreign trade distortions, etc.);
(ii) considerable gains from learning by doing within the institutional infrastructure of
the market economy which was initially non-existent (e.g. the bankruptcy courts,
customs services, financial institutions), which can be expected to continue for some time
to come;
(iii) new structural reforms which are coming on stream (e.g. pensions reform,
privatisation of utilities);
(iv) expected benefits of EU and EMU membership.
2. The well known Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect (H-B-S below) means that
richer countries have higher price levels than poorer ones. Its corollary is that faster
growing economies will experience real appreciation of their currencies relative to
countries with slower growth (either as a result of higher inflation, or of nominal
appreciation). The importance of this phenomenon in transition economies has been
pointed out in the seminal paper by Halpern and Wyplosz (1995). The simplest way to
understand the H-B-S effect is to assume that economies produce two kinds of goods:
tradeables (e.g. manufactures, primary products and agricultural products) where
productivity differs between countries and can grow at different rates across countries,
and non-tradeables (e.g. services and construction) where productivity is constant and
uniform throughout the world [1]. Finally, one assumes that all goods, but in particular
tradeables, are sold on perfectly competitive markets, and also that labour is
homogeneous and labour markets are perfectly competitive. In such a world differences
in income between any two countries are due exclusively to the productivity of their
tradeable goods sectors. In the faster growing economy productivity in the traded goods
sector rises faster than in the slower growing one, with the result that real wages must
rise faster [2]. However, because of the homogeneity of labour and the competitiveness
of labour markets, real wages must increase by the same amount in both the tradeable
and non-tradeable sectors. Since productivity in non-tradeables is constant, this means
6
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[1] In fact, it is sufficient to assume that productivity growth is lower in the non-traded goods sector, that
its growth is uniform accross countries and that returns to labour have a larger share in the non-traded goods
sector. For a formal treatment of how differential productivity growth in the two sectors affects the real
exchange rate between two countries see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 20412).
[2] This need not lead to any increase in either the domestic or foreign prices of tradeables produced by
the fast growing country, since unit labour costs denominated in foreign currency remain unchanged (the same
number of domestic workers can produce more tradeable goods and get paid proportionally more). For this
reason the nominal exchange rate need not be affected in any way either. that prices have to increase in this sector. The faster the growth rate of productivity in
the traded goods sector the faster the rate of price increase in the non-traded goods
sector. As a result, if the share of the two sectors is similar in the two countries, average
prices will rise faster in the faster growing country even if the nominal exchange rate is
constant, implying real appreciation. If the nominal exchange rate is not constant, then it
is average prices adjusted for the change in the nominal exchange rate (i.e. in the currency
of the foreign country) which will rise faster in the faster growing country, also implying
real appreciation. Now, real appreciation means that national income measured in foreign
currency rises faster than when it is measured in domestic currency. As a result the
command of domestic residents over foreign resources increases faster than indicated by
the growth of real GDP at domestic prices (in which the inflation in the non-tradeables
sector is discounted). This higher than conventionally measured real growth justifies
more smoothing of consumption, and a higher current account deficit than otherwise.
3.  Equally important, if a large part of the governments debt is denominated in
foreign currency (as is the case in many transition countries) then real appreciation leads
to a decline in the ratio of public debt to GDP , and therefore of the ratio of public debt
to the potential tax base. Even if Ricardian equivalence is only partial, residents can be
supposed to expect a lower share of taxes in national income will be needed to service
the existing public debt. This raises future disposable income and the desire to smooth
consumption (and raise the current account deficit) along with it.   
To ilustrate the above points we start with an equation for the current account
obtained from Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996):
CAt =  Bt  - Bt -1 =  Yt - Ct - Gt - It (1)
Where B is the net foreign assets owned by the residents of the country (including
their government), Y is national income, C is consumption, G government expenditure
and I investment. It is assumed, for the moment, that G is fully financed by taxation. In the
long run the current account should be in balance, the economy should have zero net
foreign assets and therefore the net present value of consumption should equal the net
present value of net income Z = Y  G  I. The representative consumer, faced with
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=where  t  is the present and s is the date of every future period, subject to the
constraint [3]:
NPV(CA) =  NPV(B) =  NPV(Y  C  G  I) = 0 (3)
which implies:
NPV(C) = NPV(Y  G  I) (4)
The operator Et {.} is "a mathematical conditional expectation  a probability-
weighted average of possible outcomes, in which probabilities are conditioned on all
information available to the decision maker up to and including date t" [Obstfeld and
Rogoff, 1996 p. 79]. Ct* is what we call the level of consumption generated by the above
procedure at time t . The current account is then given by:
CAt =  Zt  Ct* (5)
So that the current account shows a surplus if Zt > Ct* and a deficit if  Zt < Ct*. Point
(1) above (rapid expected growth of the applicant countries) implies that with consumption
smoothing it will be usually the case that Zt < Ct*, and CAt < 0. Second, the HBS effect
means that growth of national income in real foreign currency terms will be faster than in
real domestic currency terms, justifying a higher time path of Ct* and larger current account
deficits than would otherwise be the case. Third, real appreciation reduces the absolute
value of  Bt / Yt and since Bt < 0 is normal in fast growing economies, this leaves scope for
an increase in  negative net foreign assets (net foreign liabilities or debt), which by eq. (1)
leads to a larger CA deficit. Perhaps most useful of all, eq. (3) shows us that if the residents
of an applicant country revise their expectations of the NPV (Y) upwards, as it has been
argued happens at various times during he transition process [4], then they should also
increase Ct* for all t. If current Zt does not increase by as much as Ct*, and there is no reason
why it should, then the current account deficit will also increase.
At the same time there are a number of "supply" factors, inducing capital inflows,
which are likely to be present in the applicant countries:
1. Increased productivity in the tradeable goods sector and increased relative
prices in non-tradeables lead to an increased return on capital in both sectors in the
fast growing country. Observation of these trends will make foreign lenders willing to
provide increased loans to the private sector within applicant countries.
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[3]   Where NPV(CA) = NPV(CAt + CAt+1 + CAt+2 + ... + CAt+¥). The same holds for NPV (B)
and NPV(Y  C  G  I), etc.
[4] This point has been made forcefully to us by Stanislaw Gomulka in personal communications.2. The "Visegrad Three" all have full liberalisation of inward FDI flows (including
repatriation of profits and principal). Furthermore, OECD membership means that they
are already committed to freedom of outward capital flows and short term capital
movements. Some countries believe that  in practice  the extent of these latter
freedoms can still be limited at present [5]. Whether this is in fact so is unclear. In any
event, upon EU entry truly fully free capital accounts will be unavoidable. Thus, much of
the period preceding EMU entry will be one of fully free capital accounts. 
3. Increased maturity of the institutional infrastructure will strengthen creditors
property rights and exit possibilities for shareholders [6]. The prospect of imminent EU
membership can be expected to raise foreign investor' awareness of the progress which
has been made in this regard. 
From the perspective of foreign investors, high expected growth rates and real
appreciation in applicant countries means increasing asset values. This may induce a further
inflow of capital, causing further real appreciation together with a desire for higher current
account deficits and higher private sector foreign debt on the part of applicant country
residents, so that a "capital inflow  real appreciation" bubble may develop, with the real
exchange rate rising ever more above its medium term equilibrium level [7] until, finally, the
bubble bursts. Thus, setting a ceiling on the current account deficit at some prudent level
may be a justified aim of public policy in the applicant countries. The dilemmas of conducting
macroeconomic policy with such an aim and under the conditions which are likely to hold in
the run-up to EU and EMU membership, is the subject of the next section. 
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Approach to EU   
and EMU Membership
What policies will allow applicant countries keep their current account deficits at
"prudent levels"? We first look at an adaptation of the consumption-smoothing model
9
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[5] This is the view of Kopits (1999). The present authors suspect that the current degree of capital
account liberalisation is so great in the "Visegrad three" countries, that remaining controls are not effectively
binding (i.e. they do not allow macroeconomic results, different from those which would occur in the absence
of the controls, to be achieved). 
[6] In the presence of limited liability and asymetric information in the provision of finance, there is
increased risk to lenders as leverage increases, so that only part of the current account deficit can be financed
through the accumulation of foreign debt by the private sector. The rest is financed by foreign direct investment
(FDI). 
[7] And the current account deficit rising ever more above its sustainable level. The IMF has a very crude
procedure for estimating the level of a countrys sustainable current account deficit [Knight and Scacciavillani, 1998].discussed in the previous section to help us analyse the policy implications in the medium-
term, and then at short-term the Mundell-Flemming model.
We adapt the model by adding tax revenue as a determinant of the current account,
and by specifying the medium-term determinants of the RHS of the CA equation.
Including tax revenue is justified by the weakness of the empirical evidence for Ricardian
equivalence [e.g. Wilcox, 1989]. G and I can be spent on imports just like C and therefore
subtract from any positive CAt, while taxes subtract from disposable income which could
be spent on imports. Since Y  C = S (savings) we rewrite eq.1 as follows (including the
behavioural determinants of the variables on the right hand side):
CAt =  Bt - Bt-1 = St (Y, e)  (Gt  Tt)  It (r*, h) (6)
We make the Keynesian assumption that savings depend on national income and the
neo-classical assumption that investment depends on the world interest rate r*, and add
the shift variables e and h which represent the effects of (upward) changes in
expectations regarding growth. Increases in the variable e causes S to decline, while
increases in h cause I to increase [8]. Changes in both variables are assumed to be
random, but are restricted to being non-negative (i.e. if et < et-1 when random values of
e are drawn then we set et = et-1, and we do the same for h). Finally, consumers are
assumed not to be able to anticipate future values of e, or to calculate their expected
value E(et) > 0 (the same goes for h). We seek justification for these highly irrational
expectations in the completely unprecedented nature of the transition from communism
to capitalism [9]. Thus over time, but in a highly unpredictable way, the gap between I and
S increases, increasing the current account deficit. The only way the authorities can offset
this trend is to reduce the budget deficit G  T, possibly to the extent of turning it into a
large surplus. 
As in the earlier version of the consumption-smoothing model, an unanticipated
reduction in the absolute value of  Bt / Yt (due to an increase in Yt or to real appreciation)
implies a reduction in net foreign liabilities/ GDP , since normally Bt < 0 in fast growing
economies, and therefore brings about a desire by consumers to increase the NFL/GDP
ratio. As before, this implies a reduction in Bt below Bt-1, and therfore a current account
deficit. However, we encounter an ambiguity regarding the policy implications of the
model at this point: while the direct effects of a reduction in the budget deficit should
reduce a current account account deficit (the traditional two-gap model result), if a
10
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[8] We are grateful to Stanislaw Gomulka for suggesting this approach to us. 
[9]  A more acceptable way of putting this might be that E(et) = 0, and the effects we are discussing will
occur if the actual values of et exceed this  (the same goes for h).significant part of public debt is held abroad  as is the case in the applicant countries 
an unexpected tightening in fiscal policy reduces government net foreign liabilities and
therefore induces the private sector to increase its own net foreign liabilities. The result
might be that total net foreign liabilities remain unchanged. In such a case (which we can
call the "crowding in of private sector foreign debt") the current account deficit is
unaffected by reductions in the fiscal deficit in the medium term. 
This is the equivalent of so-called "Ricardian equivalence" but regarding the impact of
fiscal policy on the current account rather than on aggregate demand. Although empirical
evidence for standard Ricardian equivalence is weak, we believe it may be stronger in the
present context because of constraints originating from the international suppliers of
credit. We know that these often look at the total endebtedness of a countrys residents,
both public and private, when assessing an individual residents credit risk. Of course, the
extent to which this actually happens depends on the proportion of the reduction in the
fiscal deficit which goes to reducing foreign public debt below its previously expected
level. The lower this proportion, the stronger the standard effect of public sector deficit
reduction on the current account deficit will be. We shall see below that similar doubts
as to the efficacy of fiscal policy for current account deficit reduction resurface even in
the context of the Mundell-Flemming model and its application to policy making in the
short-term.
To analyse the implications of the effects we describe in the previous section for
macroeconomic policy in the short term, we look at the Mundell-Flemming model with
perfect capital mobility, risk neutral investors and fully flexible exchange rates. We assume
that in the short term the exchange rate is not expected to change, i.e.
rt + ut = re
t = rt-1 (7)
Where the last periods expectations of the current periods exchange rate (re
t),
which are simply the last period's actual exchange rate (rt-1) efficiently predict the current
periods actual exchange rate (rt), where ut is a normally distributed error term). In such
a case, if there were a difference between the rate of return on domestic and foreign
assets, investors would put all of their money into the asset with the higher return. Since
both kinds of assets are held it follows that their returns must be equal. Since exchange
rate expectations are static, it follows that rates of return (i.e. interest rates) must be the
same in the two countries:
i  =  i* (8)
where i is the domestic rate of interest, and i* is the world rate (given exogenously).
This means that the LM curve (representing equilibria in the "money" market) becomes:
11
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M/P  = L(i*,Y) L1< 0, L2> 0 (9)
while the "goods market equilibrium" IS curve becomes:
Y = C(Y - T) + I(i* - pe) + NX(Y, rP*/P) + G
C1 > 0,  I1 < 0, NX1 < 0, NX2 > 0 (10)
where pe is expected domestic inflation, P* is the foreign price level, P is the domestic
price level and NX is net exports (remaining variables are as conventionally or previously
defined) [10].
The result in r,Y space is a vertical LM curve and an upward sloping IS curve:
Any tightening of monetary policy by the authorities is immediately offset "one for
one" by capital inflows, because i cannot rise above i*. This capital inflow must be offset
by a deterioration of the current account, so that the policy is in fact counterproductive
[11]. Intuitively we can understand this if we remember that, given that the domestic
[10] A more general formulation is: 
Y = E(i* -pe, G - T, rP*/P , Y) E1< 0, E2 > 0, E3 > 0, 0 < E4< 1






LM0 LM1interest rate is fixed at the level of the world rate, a reduction in M can only affect the
exchange rate, which appreciates, reducing net exports [12]. If capital movements were
not perfectly free in the very short term, so that the authorities could succeed in reducing
M (in spite of their difficulty in raising i) this would have two offsetting effects. On the one
hand it would reduce Y, increasing net exports (NX) and improving the current account
balance. On the other hand, it would lead to a nominal appreciation of the domestic
currency  a reduction in r  and if P (the domestic price level) is sticky downwards we
would also have real appreciation, so that net exports would decline and the current
account balance would deteriorate (see Figure 1, where r is defined as units of domestic
currency/unit of foreign currency, so that a decline indicates an appreciation). Which of
the two effects will be stronger depends on the various elasticities, but in neither case is
the policy likely to be very powerful. Returning to the case of perfect capital mobility in
the short term, expanding rather than contracting M will lead to capital outflow (to obtain
the infinitesimally higher interest rate abroad) and therefore to nominal depreciation. In
the short run there will also be real depreciation if prices are sticky, so that the current
account deficit would be successfully reduced [13]. However, in the medium term
increased  M would lead to higher prices (not allowed for in the fixed price level Mundell-
Flemming model), which would likely mean breaching the Maastricht criterion on
inflation, and also to an erosion of the real depreciation and a reversal of the
improvement in the current account. Thus, in the medium term, sustaining a "prudent"
level of the current account through expansionary monetary policy would require
accelerating inflation which would clearly be inconsistent with the Maastricht inflation
criterion.
If the exchange rate is credibly fixed, then the domestic authorities have no influence
over M. They have to respond to sales (purchases) of foreign (domestic) currency with a
supply of central bank domestic (international) reserves, so that M becomes entirely
endogenous and cannot affect the curent account in any way. Monetary policy is thus
unlikely to be effective in reducing a current account deficit whichever of the two
exchange rate regimes, floating or fixed, is in force. This result is confirmed by empirical
studies, which find that in the Mundell-Flemming model and its Dornbusch (1976)
extension, changes in monetary policy are unable to predict either nominal or real
exchange rate changes [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996 pp.6226].
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[12] This reduces Y. Hence in a small open economy with a floating exchange rate, contractionary
monetary policy affects Y via r rather than via i.
[13] Alternatively we can think of the expansionary monetary policy as causing a one to one offsetting
capital outflow which by definition improves the current account. For the extent to which the final outcome
necessarily involves or not a depreciation of the domestic currency see Kouri (1978).On the other hand, with fully free capital movements, the Mundell-Flemming model
suggests that fiscal policy becomes highly effective in determining the current account
balance, both under free and fixed exchange rate regimes. If the exchange rate floats and
the fiscal deficit is reduced so that G  T in eq. (10) falls, then the IS curve in Fig. 2 shifts
to the left, leading to depreciation of the exchange rate without any effect on output:
aggregate demand falls as a result of the direct effect of the fall in G  T (together with
any multiplier effects it may have) while the depreciation of the currency increases net
exports (NX) by an exactly offsetting amount. National Income remains constant because
it is determined by real money balances (M/P) in the money market equation (9), but the
accompanying nominal depreciation leads to an improvement in the current account. The
depreciation may have some inflationary effects over time, which may partially offset the
current account improvement, however, with no increase in domestic M, such effects
need not be very powerful:
With a fixed exchange rate the model consists in eq. (10) and:
r = r (11)
In Y, r space this gives the following equilibria:
14






IS1A reduction in the budget deficit causes a fall in Y and thus an increase in (NX) helping
to achieve the aim of a "prudent" level for the current account deficit. As previously
stated, a reduction (increase) in M merely leads to an increase (reduction) in the
international reserves of the central bank. The overall conclusion is that keeping the
economy on course for EMU membership  in the face of the medium term effects
(described in Section 2) which are pushing the applicant countries towards increasing
current account deficits  implies ever tightening fiscal positions for these countries. Since
the Czech Republic and Poland already have fiscal deficits well within the Maastricht fiscal
policy criterion, achieving a prudent current account position may require them to run
significant budget surpluses in their last pre-EMU entry years.
This conclusion, though, is brought into question by the medium term consumption-
smoothing model we looked at earlier in this section. There we saw that also the effect
of fiscal policy on the current account might be ambiguous. That result inspires one to ask
whether there are other indirect effects of a tightening of fiscal policy which might cast
doubt even in the short term on the conclusions we arrived at within the Mundell-
Flemming framework. For instance, a tightening of fiscal policy could lead to a positive re-
evaluation of the expected future worth of a countrys currency, leading to its
appreciation, rather than depreciation, and therefore to an increase in the current
account deficit rater than a reduction. That this might not be mere theorizing is indicated
by the view of some Hungarian economists that their currencys avoidance of rapid real
15






Y1 Y0appreciation over recent years has been due to the governments large fiscal deficit,
something which cannot be explained in the Mundell-Flemming framework or even in the
standard version of the medium term consumption-smoothing model. Furthermore,
evidence from OECD countries shows that, while sharp reversals of fiscal policy may
affect the current account deficit in the expected direction, the link between fiscal and
current account deficits is usually insignificant [Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996 pp.1445]. This
is the kind of result which Knight and Scacciavillani (1998) have in mind when they draw
the rather gloomy conclusion that exchange rate movements and current account
changes may, in fact, be indeterminate.
4. Inflation, Interest Rates and Exchange Rate Regimes 
in the pre-EMU Accession Period, and their 
Implications for Conformity with the Maastricht 
Criteria
Because of their expected rapid growth rate, the H-B-S effect may be very strong in
the applicant transition countries. Thus, in the 1990s real appreciation has occurred at a
rate of 2% per annum in Portugal and only 0.4% per annum in Spain [14], while in Poland
it has averaged 7.5% during 199397. This difference seems to be related to the
difference in growth rates, with the Portuguese and Spanish economies growing at under
2% per annum, while Poland grew at about 6%. As growth rates accelerate in the other
applicant countries, we can expect rates of real appreciation to reach very high levels as
well. The implications for the achievement of the Maastricht criteria for stage three of
EMU by the applicant countries are profound.
First, it may be unwise for the applicant countries to achieve the inflation criterion,
which at present requires that inflation not exceed the average of the three best
performers within EMU +1.5%. If the H-B-S effect were to require a real appreciation
of 7.5% per annum relative to the Euro zone (as Polish experience suggests it might),
then this criterion would imply a nominal appreciation of at least 6% per annum. Such a
policy may entail two kinds of risks:
1. The current Maastricht inflation criterion is in fact unsuitable for countries in which
a strong H-B-S effect operates, since it seeks to limit what is better thought of as a
relative price change (between traded and non-traded goods) rather than as an increase
in the overall price level. If, as we have assumed, prices are constant in the traded goods
16
CASE-CEU Working Papers Series No. 26  Jacek Rostowski
[14]  19901997 for both countries. sector of the rapidly growing country while productivity increases rapidly, then the
nominal exchange rate can also remain constant without affecting that countrys trade or
current accounts. Increases in the prices of non-traded goods (resulting from the need to
pay homogeneous labour higher wages in both sectors given the increase in its average
productivity) need therefore have no effect on the current account or the equilibrium
exchange rate. In fact, for prices to be constant in the rapidly growing country, its
currency needs to appreciate nominally to such an extent that the ensuing fall in the
domestic price of tradeables compensates for inflation in non-tradeables, so that:
- a PT (¶r/¶t)/r = (1 - a)pNT (12)
is required for p = 0 (where a is the share of tradeables in national income, PT is the
price of tradeables, r is the exchange rate defined as units of domestic currency per unit
of foreign currency, pNT is the rate of inflation on non-traded goods and p is the average
inflation rate). But such a nominal appreciation implies a deterioration in the trade and
current accounts of the rapidly growing country which the growth in the productivity of
labour in its tradeables sector by itself does not require, and which is therefore likely to
be a move away from the equilibrium exchange rate [15].
2. If nominal appreciation is sufficient for eq. (12) to hold, then the interest parity
condition:
- [(¶r/¶t)/r]e + i =  i* (13)
may well imply negative short-term nominal interest rates in the applicant country [16].
For example, if we take the rate of nominal appreciation implicit in (1) meeting the
Maastricht inflation criterion and (2) having the same real appreciation as Poland did
during 199397 (i.e. a nominal appreciation of over 6% per annum), then with i* = 4%,
i needs to be 2%! In the spirit of Dornbusch (1976), we suggest that this anomaly may
be avoided through an initial upward jump in the value of the domestic currency, so that
subsequent expected appreciation is low enough for i > 0. However, it is also possible
17
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[15] Much depends on the nature of what is produced by the non-traded goods sector. If it is exclusively
non-storeable services, then the result we described above indeed follows. If non-tradeables include assets (e.g.
land or buildings, the returns to which are expected to increase with increased productivity in the tradeables
sector and real appreciation in the non-tradeables sector), then the anticipation of these processes can be
expected to induce a capital inflow, which will cause an appreciation of the equilibrium nominal exchange rate
and will in fact help to stifle average inflation.
[16] Because r is defined as units of domestic currency/unit of foreign currency, appreciation involves a
reduction in it (i.e. a negative growth rate of r), which therefore has to be subtracted from the domestic
interest rate [giving a positive effect to the LHS of eq. (13)] to arrive at the foreign interest rate. that an "appreciation bubble" may develop, with the exchange rate overshooting its
sustainable level (and ultimately collapsing) [17]. Alternatively, the expectation of nominal
appreciation could put such downward pressure on the domestic interest rate that an
explosion of of domestic credit ensues.
Second, there are a number of difficulties in devising a suitable exchange rate regime
for the the CEE applicants for the period immediately prior to EMU entry. This matter
has been discussed by G.Kopits (1999). However, we believe that Kopits has
underestimated the difficulties which may arise. There are a number of possible exchange
rate arrangements in the pre-EMU period:
1. Fixed rate (this is currently the mechanism obtaining in Estonia). Hungary has a
variant of this, a pre-announced crawling devaluation of the currency with a very narrow
band of permitted fluctuations around the central rate. As inflation decreases in Hungary,
and the rate of crawl is consequently reduced to zero, the Hungarian system will
converge on the Estonian one (unless the band for permitted fluctuations is considerably
widened). As we have seen, such a system is very likely to be incompatible with the
Maastricht inflation criterion, simply because of the operation of the H-B-S effect.
Expected rapid growth will lead to high levels of capital inflows which may result in the
need to choose between (a) dangerously high CA deficits, or (b) inflation well above that
due solely to the H-B-S effect [18].
2.Wide fluctuation bands (+/15%) around the central rate as in the current
ERM2. This holds at present in the Czech Republic and Poland [19]. This is likely to
lead to nominal appreciation and high CA deficits, but may give the possiblity of
fulfilling the inflation criterion. As Kopits points out, appreciation even beyond the
"fluctuation band" does not infringe the Maaastricht exchange rate criterion. One
danger is an "appreciation bubble", which leads to a rate which is unsustainable. This
could lead to a collapse of the exchange rate before accession to EMU (which would
be against the Maastricht requirements), or to an overvalued exchange rate at the
time of joining, which could mean a lengthy period of low growth within EMU [20].
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[17] The 15% band of the current ERM2 mechanism could well be sufficient for such a bubble to develop.
Once it had done so it would likely be allowed to break through the ceiling, since the alternative would be to
acquiesce in higher inflation.
[18] Due to the effect of capital inflow on the domestic money base. The ensuing inflation will ultimately
lead to a high CA deficit as well.
[19] In Poland the central rate is devalued at a preannounced crawl, but this feature is to be abolished in
the year 2000.
[20] This seems to be the current problem in Germany.5. Conclusions
 The H-B-S effect means that there will be powerful pressures for real appreciation
in the applicant countries in the medium term [Halpern and Wyplosz, 1995].
 Rapid expected growth, the HBS effect (via its effect on the ratio of foreign
debt/GDP) and various factors increasing the supply of foreign capital, mean that
applicant countries are likely to run large and growing current account deficits.
 Monetary policy will be either counter-productive, likely to risk the return of high
inflation, or ineffective.
 Only fiscal policy may have the potential to effectively limit current account deficits
to what the authorities are likely to consider prudent levels (and this is so under both
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes). As a result of their need to tighten fiscal policy
in each successive year while they are EMU pre-ins, countries with relatively low fiscal
deficits at present such as the Czech Republic or Poland, may therefore need to run
substantial surpluses (possibly of the order of several percentage points of GDP) by the
time they join EMU. We should consider the extent to which this is likely to be politically
feasible. 
 Tight fiscal policy may, however, prove ineffective in limiting current account
deficits, as a result of its effect on the private sectors willingness to increase its foreign
indebtedness. In that case there is a serious danger that a real appreciation boom-bust
cycle may blow applicant countries off their course to EMU membership.
 The Maastricht Treaty inflation criterion for EMU membership should not be
applied to the CEE applicant countries when the time comes for them to join the Euro
zone, although the exchange rate criterion should, of course, be maintained.
 A fixed exchange rate policy in the run-up to EMU membership will make the
attainment of the Maastricht inflation criterion completely impossible (which will not
matter if the latter has been dropped). However, a wide-band ERM2 type of arrangement
carries its own risks of high exchange rate volatility.
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